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The guardians of the world’s food supply face
a communication challenge of extraordinary
complexity. They need to be ready at short notice
to deal with various crises, often involving
baffling combinations of foods, pathogens, handling
and distribution practices, dietary norms, and
interactions with medical conditions and medica-
tions. Their response to this challenge may have
important health, economic, and even political
implications. Conflicting pressures may come
from groups that bear the cost when the public
health response is too swift or too slow. Quick,
confident explanations are expected after out-
breaks that may never be fully understood. When
consumers (and producers) need information,
they cannot wait for more research. Consumers
can read between the lines, especially when they
perceive their lives or livelihoods at risk. If they
misread messages, the communicators may still
be held responsible. Moreover, consumers know
that silence is also a form of communication.
At the same time, the guardians of the food
supply must wage a continuing struggle to
improve the handling of food. In the United
States, campaigns are under way for cooking beef
more thoroughly, separating raw meat from
salad ingredients, and improving the sanitation
of food handlers (e.g., Operation Clean Hands).
To some extent, these campaigns are the
incarnations of old messages that have not been
communicated effectively. At the same time, the
campaigns are responses to changes in the food
supply that have increased the risks associated
with conventional practices. For example, as the
incidence or severity of foodborne disease
pathogens increases, the effectiveness of custom-
ary food-handling practices decreases.
This article briefly reviews risk perception
and communication research as a possible
resource for better understanding (and perhaps
meeting) the public’s needs (1-3). Communication
research provides a set of general tools and
theories, as well as a body of results, showing a
complex picture of strengths and weaknesses in
lay understanding of risk. We explore here the
implications for anticipating public response to
emerging foodborne pathogens and offer a
proposal for how an effective communication
campaign might be organized.
Although risk communication research does
not directly address emerging foodborne patho-
gens, it is compatible with the model of risk
assessment that the food industry seems to be
adopting (4). Drawn from the National Research
Council’s (5) volume, Improving Risk Communi-
cation, the model involves overlapping processes
of assessing the magnitude of risks (through
analytical procedures), managing their level
(through practical measures), and communicat-
ing with the public about them.
Like many other risks, emerging foodborne
pathogens are of primary concern to some
specialists but one more thing to worry about for
ordinary citizens. The thought processes that
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people rely on for making decisions are the focus
of much research (Table; 6).
How much does the public know and
understand? The answer to this question
depends on the risks consumers face and the
opportunities they have to learn about them.
The next section discusses strategies for
improving those opportunities.
Communicating Risk
An overarching theme of risk communication
is that people understand risks that draw their
attention and are presented comprehensibly.
Whether the public’s attention is aroused
spontaneously or as a result of a message, the
opportunity must be seized. The right informa-
tion must be selected and communicated
appropriately (1,16,17).
The hallmarks of effective communication
should be used. Match the audience’s level of
technical sophistication. Do not talk down.
Clarify terms (e.g., virus) that are used in
everyday speech but not very precisely (e.g., risk).
Organize information. Provide the audience with
a quick logical overview. Make the desired level of
detail easy to read. Use numbers to communicate
quantities. Avoid ambiguous verbal quantifiers,
such as “rare” or “likely”. Ensure source
credibility. Realize that messengers are a part of
the message and essential to its interpretation.
Use knowledgeable sources that will not
misrepresent the message. Avoid risk compari-
sons with rhetorical implications. Comparing one
uncontrollable accident risk with another, more
familiar one (e.g., half as likely as being injured
by lightning) can be useful; however, people
dislike comparisons that imply they should
accept one risk because they accept another, e.g.,
comparing the risks of nuclear power with those
of eating peanut butter (from aflatoxin).
However useful communication research
may be, there is no substitute for empirical
testing of messages. With heterogeneous audi-
ences, any fixed message will work better for
some people than for others. In such cases,
universal understanding may require provid-
ing the opportunity for the public to ask
questions through public information sessions,
agricultural extension services, science teach-
ers, or toll-free numbers.
What To Say
The effort to communicate is wasted if the
information is not worth communicating, either
because people already know it or because it
makes no difference to them. Indeed, communica-
tion can backfire if consumers think that their
Table. Thought processes involved in decision-making
People simplify. Many decisions require people to deal
with more details than they can readily handle at any
one time.  To cope with the overload, people simplify.
People want to know if foods are “safe,” rather than
treating safety as a continuous variable; they demand
proof from scientists who can provide only tentative
findings; and they divide the participants in risk
disputes into good guys and bad guys.  Such
simplifications help people cope, yet also lead to
predictable biases (7).
Once people’s minds are made up, it’s hard to change
them.  People are adept at maintaining faith in their
beliefs unless confronted with overwhelming evidence
to the contrary.  One psychologic process that helps
people to maintain their current beliefs is underesti-
mating the need to seek contrary evidence.  Another
process is exploiting the uncertainty surrounding
negative information to interpret it as consistent with
existing beliefs (8).
People remember what they see.  People are good at
keeping track of events that come to their attention
(9,10).  As a result, if the appropriate facts reach people
in a credible way before their minds are made up, their
first impression is likely to be the correct one.
Unfortunately, it is hard for people to gain firsthand
knowledge of many risks, leaving them to decipher the
incomplete reports they get.
People cannot readily detect omissions in the evidence
they receive.  It is unusual both to realize that one’s
observations may be biased and to undo the effects of
such biases. Thus people’s risk perceptions can be
manipulated in the short run by selective presenta-
tions.  People will not know and may not sense how
much has been left out (11).  What happens in the long
run depends on whether the missing information is
revealed by other experiences or sources.
People may disagree more about what “risk” is than
about how large it is.  One obstacle to determining what
people know about specific risks is disagreement about
the definition of “risk” (12-15).  For some risk experts,
the natural unit of risk is an increase in probability of
death; for others, it is reduced life expectancy; for still
others, it is the probability of death per unit of
exposure. If lay people and risk managers use the term
“risk” differently, they may agree on the facts of a
hazard, but disagree about its riskiness.
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time is being wasted with useless messages while
they are being denied pertinent information. An
analytical effort to determine what is worth
knowing and a coordinated empirical effort to
determine what people know already are
required. These efforts take different forms in
situations where consumers face well-formulated
decisions and need only a few quantitative
estimates before making choices, and in situations
where consumers are trying to understand the
processes creating and controlling a risk, in order to
follow public discussion, devise decision options, or
understand quantitative estimates.
Identifying Relevant Estimates
The tools of decision analysis provide ways to
determine how sensitive well-structured choices
are to uncertainty in different decision param-
eters (18,19). The more sensitive parameters
should receive more attention, unless consumers
know them already (and need no reminder). If
conditions do not permit sensitivity analyses for
individual decision makers, one can model the
information needs of a population similar to the
intended audience. Merz et al. (20) demonstrated
this approach for communicating to carotid
endarterectomy candidates. Scraping out the
main artery to the brain reduces the probability
of stroke for patients with arteriosclerosis.
However, the procedure can cause many
problems, including strokes. Decision analysis
computed the attractiveness of surgery for a
hypothetical population of patients, with a
distribution of physical states (e.g., stroke risks)
and values (e.g., time horizons). The analysis
found that three of the potential complications
(stroke, facial paralysis, and persistent head-
aches) posed sufficient risk that learning about
them should dissuade about 30% of candidates
from surgery. Learning about the other side
effects should affect few additional patients.
Therefore, physicians trying to secure informed
consent should (while not hiding other informa-
tion) make sure that patients understand the
risks of these three complications.
Identifying Relevant Processes
Risk analysis provides one way to identify the
critical processes in creating and controlling
risks. Figure 1 shows a simple model for the risks
of foodborne pathogens. It uses the formalism of
the influence diagram (21,22). Such a model can
be used both to assess risks and to characterize
the comprehensiveness of lay understanding. In
this model, people incur food-related risks as a
result of decisions, which possibly lead to actions
or exposures. These decisions concern such
actions as eating a bite of suspicious food,
choosing a particular diet, or opting for school (or
home) lunch. Those decisions depend, in part, on
the perceived risks of those actions as well as
other nonrisk factors (i.e., other costs and
benefits). Exposure may follow, if a pathogen is
actually present; it can lead, in turn, to
transmission of the pathogen and to changed
health states, depending on the resistance to
disease that the person’s health provides.
Figure 2 elaborates on this model. It shows
that food pathogenicity depends on both the
prevalence of pathogens in the environment and
the quality of food handling. A person’s own
health influences risk perceptions through the
intermediate variable of perceptions of health,
which in turn is influenced by the person’s history
of food consumption (or avoidance). Actual
pathogenicity influences risk perceptions through
awareness, a variable that communicators might
affect. Nonrisk factors include visceral factors
(e.g., hunger), external social factors (e.g., social
pressure to eat any food offered by a host), norms
(e.g., not eating dog), and the expected benefits of
consumption (e.g., taste, texture, and other
gustatorial pleasures). Computing risks with
this model would require specifying each
variable and estimating the contingencies by
using statistical sources or expert judgment.
For risk communication purposes, even a
qualitative model can define the universe of
discourse and allow approximate estimates of
the most important relationships (23).
Identifying Current Knowledge
Determining what people already know
about quantitative estimates is relatively
straightforward, although there are various
pitfalls (24,25). Eliciting knowledge of processes
is more difficult. Respondents should be given the
focus of the problem and maximum freedom to
express their ideas and reveal which of the
processes in Figure 2 are on their minds. Studies
using open-ended techniques often find that
people speak the language of risk without
understanding its terms. For example, in a study
about radon, we found that respondents often
knew that it was a colorless, odorless, radioactive
gas that caused lung cancer. However, when492 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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Figure 1. Diagram of the general model.
pressed, respondents often revealed inappropri-
ate notions of radioactivity, believing that
anything radioactive would permanently con-
taminate their homes. Some told us that they
would not test for radon because there was
nothing that they could do if they found a problem
(26). In studies with adolescents, we found other
forms of false fluency; for example, teens used
terms such as “safe sex” and “clean needles”
without understanding them (23). Without open-
ended probing, we miss misconceptions that a
technical expert never would have imagined, or
we use language that does not communicate
effectively with our audience (27).
Food Industry Communication Strategies
Technical experts (in any industry) generally
want to get the facts in order before saying
anything. Although that is an appropriate norm
within the scientific community, refusing to
address a concerned public can evoke mistrust
and anger, as can failing to arouse an apathetic
public. To steer an appropriate course, communi-
cators need an explicit policy that balances the
risks of saying too much with the risks of saying
too little. The policy must consider both what to
say and when to say it. From a decision theory
perspective, citizens need information critical to
identifying actions that will help them achieve
personal goals. As a result, any recommenda-
tions should reflect both scientific knowledge
and citizens’ values. That is, consumers need to
know what is the best gamble, given the trade-
offs between, for example, the risks of throwing
out good food and the risks of eating food that
might make them sick.
At times, there may be a temptation not to tell
it like it is. For example, one might argue that
risks should be exaggerated when a frank report
would leave people unduly apathetic, as judged
by their own standards. That is, people should
say “Thanks for getting my attention” once the
grounds for the overstatement were made clear.
Such gratitude requires a public that not only
recognizes the limits of its own understanding,
but also accepts paternalistic and manipulative
authorities. That acceptance seems more
likely  for misrepresentations intended to get a493 Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Figure 2. Diagram of the foodborne model.
complacent public moving than for ones intended
to allay a hysterical public’s fears. In either case,
once the secret is out, all future communications
may be subjected to second guessing (“How
seriously should we take them this time?”).
One situation in which paternalistic author-
ity is needed arises when a single message must
be sent to a heterogeneous audience—for
example, when officials must decide whether to
declare a particular food “safe.” Safety is a
continuous variable, and any cut-off represents a
value judgment. For any given food, different
groups may face different risks, derive different
benefits, and want to make different trade-offs. For
example, a few people are strongly allergic to sulfur
dioxide as a dried food preservative. Marketing
such foods signals their safety to all. Labels that
declare preservatives in foods allow consumers to
customize their risk levels, but only if they know
their own risks (i.e., whether they are strongly
allergic, which they may learn only through a bad
reaction whose source they identify).
The Food and Drug Administration faces a
similar challenge in its effort to standardize risk
labels for over-the-counter drugs. For example,
other things being equal, producing bilingual
labels will require either reducing print size or
omitting information about some side effects.
These modifications would, in turn, increase the
risks for consumers with limited vision (e.g.,
some of the elderly) or those particularly
sensitive to the omitted effects. Whatever
labeling, warning, or communication strategy is
chosen will leave some residual risk, with an
uneven distribution depending on the heteroge-
neous sensitivities of the audience. Thus, the
strategy reflects the authorities’ notion of the
“acceptable level of misunderstanding” (28).
What that acceptable level should be is a
political and ethical question, which could be
resolved by properly constituted public or private
groups, and a scientific question, partially
resolvable by research of the sort described here.
Rigorous empirical testing is needed to deter-494 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 4, October–December 1997
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mine whether communications fulfill the hopes
placed in them (27). Emerging foodborne
pathogens provide a particular challenge to
safety communications—and a particular need
for evaluation. Their novelty and ability to produce
outbreaks  in diverse places in the world and the
food chain encourage treating them as unique. If a
communication strategy is improvised only when a
crisis hits, or as it evolves, the chances for a
misstep increase. Those chances are especially
large if the outbreak is the first major risk
problem for the health authorities involved (16).
As a result, communications about these
unique situations should be routine. A standard
format for reporting risk information should be
adopted. Funtowicz and Ravetz (29) propose a
notation that includes a best-guess risk estimate
(expressed in standard units), a measure of
variability, and a “pedigree” (indicating the quality
of the research). Although new, such notation
might become familiar, much as degrees
Fahrenheit, miles per gallon, probability of
precipitation, and recommended daily allow-
ance have become familiar.
Another part of communication planning is to
adopt standard scripts for reporting complex
procedural information regarding what citizens
should do and what food specialists are doing.
The adoption process should include empirically
testing the comprehensibility of concrete mes-
sages with an audience like the intended
audience. Influence diagrams offer one template
for organizing procedural information.  Risk
analyses provide one way to identify the crises
most likely to occur and may allow not only
testing the most likely messages, but also
identifying the persons most likely to do the
communicating and preparing them accordingly.
The chemical industry’s Community Awareness
and Emergency Response program might provide
some useful lessons in how to organize for
unlikely events, although the challenges of
dealing with the relatively identifiable commu-
nity surrounding a chemical plant are different
from those presented by dealing with the diffuse
national (or even international) audience con-
cerned about a food. The chemical industry’s
experience may also provide guidance on how
to achieve voluntary industry compliance with
a set of communication principles. Public
goodwill is eroded every time an industry
spokesperson violates the public trust by
misrepresenting, or just explaining inadequately,
the state of affairs. Reducing misrepresentation
requires institutional discipline; reducing inad-
equate communication requires a scientific
approach to communication.
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